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Abstract
In this paper we attempt to explain the evolution of the vote share and the number
of populist parties running for legislative elections in the European Union. We build a
database of 276 elections since 1976 until 2018 and account for 285 populist parties of
both political spectrums. We run two sets of models to show the different variables that
explain the behavior of the populist vote share and the number of populist parties and a
third model to assess the dynamics of both types of dependent variables.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, populism has become a common buzzword in politics and media around the
globe. The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, the United Kingdom’s
vote to leave the European Union and the rise of many parties deemed populist, both on the
left and right of the political spectrum, in many countries in the European Union, have made
the word populism a household name, even considered word of the year by the Cambridge
Dictionary in 2017. Professor Cas Mudde, one of the leading scholars of populism in the world
today, describes his academic work in one of his social media accounts in the following way:
“Used to study fringe politics, now study mainstream politics”.
We chose to focus on the European Union as it encompasses a large number of relatively
advanced democracies but with significant contrasts between each other due to the existence
of complex and diverse populist movements across the Union. The uniqueness of the political
construct that is the EU constitutes a fascinating and intriguing target of research. The possible
role of populism in the development of the european project turns it into a topic of utmost
relevance.
So called populist politicians have indeed been gaining ground in Europe. By the end of
2017, out of 28 countries in the European Union, 11 have populist parties in the government.
Of these 11 governments, only the Greek government has both left-wing and right-wing par-
ties - SYRYZA and ANEL, respectively. Of the remaining 10 governments only the Estonian
government has a left-wing party, with the other 9 having right-wing parties.
In total, 19 governments in the EU enjoy the parliamentary support of populist parties. In
the Czech Republic, the government of center right populist party ANO 2011 and mainstream
Czech Social Democratic Party enjoy parliamentary support of far-left Communist Party of
Bohemia and Moravia.
There are 5 governments in which mainstream parties alone are represented in the cabinet
but enjoy parliamentary support of populist parties: the Danish, Croat and Lithuanian govern-
ments are supported by right-wing populist parties and the Spanish and Portuguese governments
are supported in parliament by left-wing populist parties.
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In total, there are currently 60 populist political parties represented in the 28 lower or single
houses of parliament of European Union member states, with 36 being right-wing and 24 left-
wing. Romania and Malta are the only EU member countries in which no populist parties hold
any seats in the lower house of parliament.
Figures 1 and 2 show that total populist vote share is at an almost 30-year high reaching
almost 30%. This growth has been boosted mostly by right-wing populist, which has been
growing steadily since the turn of the millennium, while left-wing populism has also grown
but at a much slower pace, experiencing a hike in support during the European Sovereign Debt
Crisis.
In 1990, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the democratization of the former Eastern Block,
we see a decline in support for left-wing populist and a surge in right-wing populism. The
introduction of the Euro also seems to coincide with increased growth of right-wing populism.
At the number of parties level, we also see a decline in left-wing parties around 1990 and
a surge in right-wing parties beginning in 2000. There is also a dip during the crisis and a
recovery around 2015








































Green lines: fall of the Berlin Wall, introduction of the Euro and first Greek bailout
The definition of populism is still up for debate among academics. Therefore, it is vital
that a clear definition of populism is adopted in order to differ populism from commonplace
demagoguery.
In this paper, we will loosely follow the ideational approach to populism. The ideational ap-
proach, according to Mudde (2004), defines populism as follows:
...a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ’the pure people’ versus the ’corrupt
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte´ ge´ne´rale
(general will) of the people.
A thin-centered ideology means that populism is not a standalone ideology like Liberalism
or Socialism as it lacks ”intellectual refinement and consistency”. As such, populism is mostly
combined with other ideologies, most notably Nationalism, Socialism or Communism. Pop-
ulism isn’t anti-democracy either, but rather against liberal democracy. Populists value popular
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will and believe in majority rule, rejecting pluralism and ignoring minorities.
However, there is some disagreement on whether populism can be considered an ideology at
all. An alternative conceptualization is that of a discourse or frame (Aslanidis, 2015). Whether
populism is considered a thin-centered ideology or a type of political discourse/framing, it is
clear that it is mostly used to prop up another ideology. Throughout this paper, we will artic-
ulate the discourse/framing notion with the concept of ”pure people” vs ”corrupt elite”. This
definition will be key to identify the populist parties that will be included in the study.
In this study, we will explore different stories that purportedly explain the rise of populism
in the European Union. These stories are modernization, economic anxiety, globalization, cor-
ruption, government, migration and terrorism.
Modernization is pointed out by the literature as one of the factors that may be behind the
surge of populism (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Kriesi, 1999). This concept encompasses many
aspects such as post-industrialization and the rise of post-materialist values, which are thought
to generate a backlash, as the supposed losers of modernization seek political alternatives that
promise to bring back the previous status quo1.
Economic anxiety revolves around the notion that people who suffer from some sort of
economic deprivation are more likely to vote for a populist party that presents, as a reason for
that deprivation, the corrupt elite that bends the system against the common people. This is one
of the most explored themes in Populism literature and it is also very relevant in the European
context due to the economic effects of austerity programs enacted by many EU governments in
the advent of the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Many populist left-wing parties ran on anti-austerity
platforms during the crisis years (e.g. SYRIZA, Podemos, Anti-Austerity Alliance in Ireland).
Globalization is also seen as one of the most relevant factors explaining populism (Rodrik,
2017). Similarly to the modernization theme, it relates to the losers of Globalization, both
economic and socio-cultural. Globalization in the economic side has opened competition to
1A prime example of this aspect comes from the presidential campaign of Donald Trump, who ran on a platform
based on bringing back manufacturing jobs lost to cheap labour and unfair trading practices of foreign countries.
The whole ”Make America Great Again” theme is all about returning to a time when the average hard working
law abiding citizen used to thrive, prior to the fast changes that shaped the post-war western society and tilted the
balance in favor of the elite.
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foreign goods, services and culture that somehow undermine an idealized national and cultural
ideal of the past, cherished by some right-wing populists. Globalization is equally seen as a
byproduct of modern capitalism, making it a target of some left-wing populists as well.
The government story is about how the government treats its citizens. An interesting aspect
is, for instance, the size of the welfare state and how it interacts with demand and supply of pop-
ulist policies. It is argued that a larger welfare state provides cover from populism (Swank and
Betz, 2003). However, a far-reaching and universal welfare state may create division between
the receivers and the non receivers. This cleavage can be exacerbated if the size of the welfare
state results in a heavy tax burden.
The migration story is probably the most present in the media. Xenophobia and Racism
are often present in the discourse of right-wing populists, especially since the 2015 peak of the
european migration crisis. However, it is argued that Immigration size is often overblown by
some sectors of the native population (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2018), which may in turn
create a suitable environment for the growth of nativist and xenophobic right-wing populism.
The terrorism story is one that we want to explore as it is also often mentioned by rightwing
populists in their discourse. Terrorism has been known to have political effects. After the 9/11
terror attacks, then president George W. Bush’s opinion ratings skyrocketed (Gallup Inc, 2018)
A similar phenomenon occurred with French president Franc¸ois Hollande in 2015 after the
Charlie Hebdo attacks (France 24, 2015).
Being anti-elite sentiment one of the key elements of populism, we decided to include the
story of corruption. Anti-corruption discourse is often employed by some parties, particularly
opposition parties, new parties and parties situated on the right of the political spectrum, and has
been known to result in electoral gains (Ba˚genholm and Charron, 2014). We want to explore if
populist parties can benefit from high corruption through blaming the elite for the high level of
corruption that brings down the common people.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
t pop 276 17.35 15.18 0 72.18
r pop 276 10.08 14.43 0 72.07
l pop 276 7.27 9.07 0 45.19
r larg 276 7.79 10.45 0 52.73
l larg 276 6.43 8.42 0 37.26
t count 276 4.26 2.58 0 13
r count 276 2.08 1.65 0 8
l count 276 2.18 1.72 0 8
rural p 1316 30.7 12.98 2.04 62.03
emp agr 756 7.99 7.39 1.01 45.21
emp ind 756 28.17 6.3 10.98 50.07
growth 1073 2.81 3.47 -14.81 25.56
unemp 1025 8.11 4.54 .2 27.47
infl 1119 15.59 87.44 -4.48 1500
r gdp pc 1051 26992.01 16827.42 3834.02 111968.4
glob 1118 72.27 11.79 39.38 90.67
eco glob 1118 61.08 20.04 16.19 93.97
soc glob 1118 69.54 11.85 34.58 90.56
trade glob 1118 57.94 20.06 17.59 93.15
fin glob 1118 64.22 23.62 9.03 99.99
intper glob 1118 70.67 14.65 28.68 97.4
cult glob 1118 64.86 20.19 16.54 94.21
corr 863 34.04 14.78 7.07 60.54
terr att 1316 12.93 37.88 0 308
terr kill 1316 5.25 25.6 0 372
terr att pm 1316 .68 1.77 0 27.27
terr kill pm 1316 .27 1.78 0 52.55
govexp 1054 19.25 3.12 9.93 27.69
tax rev 997 20.51 7.68 1.23 62.86
immig 632 8.08 7.44 .03 41.79
refug 735 2.99 6.39 0 90.16
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2 Data
In this paper, we try to capture both the demand and supply of populist policies in the 28 coun-
tries that constitute the European Union. It is important to understand the difference between
the factors that influence support of populism and those that influence the creation of populist
movements. In order to capture the demand side of populism, we chose to analyze the vote
for populist parties in legislative elections. We look into aggregate vote percentages towards
all populist parties in elections for lower houses of parliament, while also analyzing right-wing
and left-wing populist parties separately. When a dual system in which there is one individual
electoral constituency and a national electoral constituency is in place (e.g. Hungary), we only
take into account the national circle as it is a better proxy for the expression of an opinion on
how the country as a whole should be governed. When a two-round system of individual con-
stituencies is in place instead of a first-past-the-post, we take into account the aggregate vote
in the first round only. We also look into how the largest populist party did on those elections
using the same method.
In order to capture the supply of populism, we look into how many populist parties run for
office in the same legislative elections, using the method described above. A possible caveat of
this approach is that mainstream parties can also supply some populist policies, a phenomenon
which we do not take into account in this study.
We use multiple sources of data for elections, with the most notable being the Global Elec-
tion Database by Dawn M. Brancati (Brancati, 2007), the book Elections in Europe: A Data
Handbook (Nohlen and Sto¨ver, 2010) and the European Election Database organized by the
Norwegian Centre for Research Data 2, which in turn draws on many sources (Budge and
Klingemann, 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; Rose and Munro, 2009; Colomer, 2008). Other
sources include National Electoral Commissions, Ministries of the Interior, National Parlia-
ments and other national online platforms dedicated to official election results.
2Some of the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on material from the ”European Election
Database”. The data are collected from original sources, prepared and made available by the NSD - Norwegian
Centre for Research Data (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented
here.
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We also use multiple sources when choosing which political parties to include in the study
as populist parties. The most significant is the one used by Stankov (2018), which in turn is
based on the Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2017 (Heino, 2017). This will include more
classical or orthodox far-left parties (e.g. Marxist Leninist, Trotskyist and Maoist) that may not
be considered populist by some authors (Santana and Rama, 2018). We decided to consider
them in this study as their are known to frame their ideology in a populist way. Some even
consider their ideologies to be purely populist (Clarke, 1998; Laclau, 1977).
We believe that these parties embody the definition of populism adopted in this paper. First
of all, they generally frame society as divided between the working class (the pure people)
and the bourgeoisie, who owns the means of production (the corrupt elite), claiming to be the
sole representatives of the working class. Secondly, even though the countries where these
ideologies became dominant eventually turned into totalitarian regimes, these parties claim to
support democracy, albeit of a different kind, arguing that a Socialist or a Communist societies
would fulfill the ultimate will of the working class they claim to represent.
Another type of party that is sometimes not recognized as populist are radical right-wing
parties (e.g. Neo-Fascist or Neo-Nazi Parties) as they are anti-democratic. However, we de-
cided to keep them as they embody some of the characteristics of populist parties, such as anti-
establishment and fostering the idea of an homogeneous group of pure people (in the racial,
ethnic and/or religious sense) who need sovereignty in their homeland.
This list is also complemented by our own research, especially relating to more recent parties
that have not yet been catalogued but that we believe to fulfill the definition adopted In total,
we include 285 political parties throughout 276 legislative elections in the 28 countries of the
European Union. The earliest election under study occurred in 1976 (Malta) and the latest
occurred in October 2018 (Luxembourg). Our dataset is the most exhaustive cross country
classification of populist parties, their electoral presence and outcomes, covering the all of the
European Union democracies in the past four decades3.
Regarding independent variables, we choose multiple variables that embody some of the
3The dataset can be accessed at https://drive.google.com/open?id=1b36S5EnczX4aDoTVAKSYyBxPDvzPc0x1
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stories we mentioned above. Related to Modernization we use rural population as a percentage
of total population, industrial employment and agricultural employment as a percentage of total
employment.
Attached to economic anxiety, we include real GDP growth, unemployment rate and CPI
inflation rate. These are the most relevant variables when assessing the performance of an
economy in the short to medium term. We will also include real GDP per capita as a control for
the wealth of each country.
Related to globalization, we work with the KOF de facto indexes of Globalization, Social
Globalization, Economic Globalization, Trade Globalization, Financial Globalization, Interper-
sonal Globalization and Cultural Globalization (Gygli et al., 2018). The Trade Globalization
index includes trade in both services and goods, as well as trading partner diversity, measured
by an average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman market concentration index for exports and imports
of goods. The Financial Globalization index monitors FDI, portfolio investment, international
debt, international reserves and international income payments. The Interpersonal Globalization
index involves international voice traffic, transfers, international tourism, international students
and migration. The Cultural Globalization index is built taking into account trade in cultural
goods and personal services, international trademarks registered in the country and number of
McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA stores.
The Economic Globalization index aggregates the previously mentioned Trade Globalization
index and a Financial Globalization index, while the Social Globalization index encompasses
the above mentioned Cultural Globalization index plus an Informational Globalization index
and a Interpersonal Globalization index.
We represent corruption using the Bayesian Corruption Index (Standaert, 2015). For ter-
rorism, we use the number of terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorists attacks per year in
each country (both in absolute terms and in per million of inhabitants scale), retrieved from the
Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START), 2018).
In government, we use total government expenditure and total tax burden, both as a percent-
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age of GDP. With government expenditure, we want to capture both the weight of the govern-
ment in the economy and the size of the welfare state. With the tax burden, we want to look at
how many resources are asked from the economy in order to finance the government.
With migration, we use the number of immigrants and the number of refugees entering the
country, per thousand inhabitants.
Sources of data, apart from the ones already mentioned, include the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018) for population, immigration, refugees, real GDP
growth, real GDP per capita, tax revenue, government expenditure, agricultural and industrial
employment, inflation and rural population. For unemployment, we used data from the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (International Labour Organization, 2018).
3 Methodology
We first proceed to create a 4-year moving average for each variable. As legislatures last 4 years
in most countries, we adapt the variables to capture the entire duration of the average political
cycle.
We conduct the three separate studies: aggregate populist vote share and largest populist
party vote share, number of populist parties and populist vote dynamics.
In the first two studies, we begin with a test of all the dependent variables against each of
the independent variables, individually. The objective of this procedure is to identify the most
relevant variables from each story to be included in eight proposed main regressions (five for
the first study and three for the second study). We use a fixed effects method to regress the eight
dependent variables with the independent variables we pretend to study. Below is an example:
t popit = t+m4 corrit−1 (1)
The total populist vote share t pop is regressed with the year of the election t, in order to
eliminate any trend behavior of the variables and the 4-year moving average of the Bayesian
Corruption Index of the year prior to the election t-1. After this procedure for all independent
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and dependent variables, we select the most relevant independent variables to be included in the
proposed regressions of each study. The results of the complete individual test are reported in
tables 3 and 5.
In subsection 4.1 where we study aggregate populist vote share and largest populist party
vote share, we propose and perform the following model using a fixed effects panel data method:
Dit = t+ l.r gdp pcit−1 + Iit−1 (2)
In the above regression, Dit represents one of five dependent variables (i.e. total, right-wing
and left-wing populist vote share and vote share of the largest right-wing and left-wing populist
parties), t stands for the year of the election and is used for excluding trend behavior from the
model, r gdp pcit-1 is the control variable 1-year lagged real GDP per capita of country i and Iit
is the vector of 4-year moving averages of the independent variables chosen from Table 3.
The independent variables included are: real GDP growth, unemployment rate, industrial
employment as a percentage of GDP, rural population as a % of total population, trade global-
ization, financial globalization, interpersonal globalization, cultural globalization, government
expenditure, immigration per thousand inhabitants, casualties per million inhabitants from ter-
rorist attacks and bayesian corruption index. We use a fixed effects panel data model were we
include the year in order to exclude trend behavior from the model and control for real GDP per
capita in the year prior to the election.
In subsection 4.2 where we study number of populist parties, we propose and test the follow-
ing model using a fixed effects panel data method, using a similar method to the one displayed
in equation (2):
Dit = t+ l.r gdp pcit−1 + Iit−1 (3)
In the above regression, Dit represents one of three dependent variables (i.e. Total number
of populist parties, number of right-wing populist parties and number of left-wing populist
parties), t stands for the year of the election and is used for excluding trend behavior from the
model, r gdp pcit-1 is the control variable 1-year lagged real GDP per capita of country i and Iit
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is the vector of 4-year moving averages of the independent variables chosen from Table 5.
The independent variables included are: real GDP growth, unemployment rate, agricultural
employment as a percentage of GDP, industrial employment as a percentage of GDP, rural
population as a percentage of total population, financial globalization, cultural globalization,
government expenditure as percentage of GDP, terrorist attacks per million inhabitants and
bayesian corruption index.
In subsection 4.3, we introduce a lagged dependent variable along the regressions of the first
two sections in order discuss the dynamics of populist vote and the difference between political
spectrums.
It results in the following type of equation:
Dit = t+ l.r gdp pcit−1 + Iit−1 +Dit−y (4)
In the above regression, Dit represents one of five dependent variables (i.e. Total number
of populist parties, number of right-wing populist parties and number of left-wing populist
parties), t stands for the year of the election and is used for excluding trend behavior from the
model, r gdp pcit-1 is the control variable 1-year lagged real GDP per capita of country i and Iit
is the vector of 4-year moving averages of the independent variables used in the previous two
sections and Dit-y represents one of five lagged dependent variables (assuming previous election
occurred y years before t.
4 Results
In this section, we analyze the results from the regressions proposed in the previous section. We
start with the aggregate populist vote share and largest populist party vote share, followed by
the number of populist parties, ending with populist vote dynamics.
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Individual Regressions of vote share dependent variables
Variables t pop r pop l pop r larg l larg
L.r gdp pc -0.000291** -0.000295** 3.34e-06 -0.000165* 3.87e-05
(-2.295) (-2.259) (-0.225) (-1.612) (0.338)
m4 growth -0.184 0.116 -0.300* 0.178 -0.222
(-0.672) (0.460) (-1.742) (0.965) (-1.378)
m4 unemp 0.172 -0.225 0.397*** -0.272* 0.300***
(0.805) (-1.164) (3.271) (-1.878) (2.655)
m4 infl -0.00937 -0.00715 -0.00222 -0.00792 -0.00196
(-0.986) (-0.784) (-0.387) (-1.164) (-0.364)
m4 emp agr 0.0769 0.229 -0.152 0.364 -0.166
(0.199) (0.678) (-0.661) (1.353) (-0.786)
m4 emp ind -0.470 0.412 -0.882*** 0.189 -0.789***
(-1.066) (1.070) (-3.484) (0.611) (-3.396)
m4 rural p 0.232 0.510** -0.278* 0.306** -0.181
(1.046) (2.593) (-1.901) (2.064) (-1.339)
m4 glob 0.310** 0.360*** -0.0502 0.254** -0.0734
(2.073) (2.685) (-0.528) (2.453) (-0.828)
m4 eco glob 0.159* 0.194** -0.0357 0.162*** -0.0339
(1.784) (2.435) (-0.632) (2.646) (-0.643)
m4 soc glob 0.164 0.377** -0.213** 0.251** -0.198**
(0.970) (2.493) (-2.005) (2.155) (-2.005)
m4 trade glob 0.330*** 0.268*** 0.0621 0.245*** 0.0675
(3.665) (3.277) (1.065) (3.931) (1.240)
m4 fin glob 0.00596 0.0869 -0.0809* 0.0600 -0.0818**
(0.0841) (1.363) (-1.825) (1.223) (-1.979)
m4 intper glob -0.192 0.0182 -0.210** -0.0565 -0.160*
(-1.222) (0.128) (-2.138) (-0.517) (-1.739)
m4 cult glob 0.0635 0.138** -0.0747* 0.0857* -0.0905**
(0.896) (2.180) (-1.681) (1.750) (-2.190)
m4 govexp -0.0726 -0.464 0.392 -0.323 0.179
(-0.189) (-1.308) (1.521) (-1.249) (0.761)
m4 tax rev -0.157 -0.0990 -0.0584 -0.142 -0.0574
(-1.018) (-0.705) (-0.584) (-1.340) (-0.611)
m4 immig -0.295 0.0890 -0.384* 0.214 -0.321*
(-1.086) (0.439) (-1.959) (1.318) (-1.862)
m4 refug -0.297 -0.273 -0.0239 -0.226 -0.0184
(-1.143) (-1.151) (-0.165) (-1.192) (-0.139)
m4 terr att 0.0264 0.00161 0.0248 0.0154 0.0231
(0.997) (0.0677) (1.416) (0.864) (1.435)
m4 terr kill 0.0371 0.0439 -0.00682 0.0372 -0.00558
(0.926) (1.225) (-0.257) (1.385) (-0.228)
m4 terr att pm 0.929* 0.630 0.299 0.555 0.270
(1.698) (1.280) (0.821) (1.507) (0.803)
m4 terr kill pm 0.685 0.956** -0.271 0.655* -0.168
(1.373) (2.149) (-0.818) (1.960) (-0.549)
m4 corr 0.750** 0.440 0.310* 0.101 0.230
(2.353) (1.489) (1.836) (0.440) (1.479)
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Fixed effects proposed regression of vote share dependent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables t pop r pop l pop r larg l larg
m4 growth -0.962* -0.446 -0.516* -0.253 -0.556**
(-1.948) (-1.095) (-1.735) (-0.793) (-2.040)
m4 unemp 0.760 0.645 0.115 0.212 0.0610
(1.397) (1.439) (0.351) (0.603) (0.203)
m4 emp ind -0.479 0.831 -1.311** 0.228 -1.209**
(-0.478) (1.006) (-2.169) (0.352) (-2.185)
m4 trade glob 0.189 0.0785 0.111 0.207 0.172
(0.642) (0.323) (0.624) (1.087) (1.055)
m4 fin glob 0.317 0.174 0.143 0.153 0.0875
(1.283) (0.853) (0.962) (0.956) (0.642)
m4 intper glob -0.762 -0.362 -0.400 -0.366 -0.297
(-1.653) (-0.953) (-1.440) (-1.230) (-1.168)
m4 cult glob -0.394* -0.328* -0.0656 -0.235 -0.109
(-1.737) (-1.757) (-0.480) (-1.603) (-0.874)
m4 govexp 0.569 -0.956 1.525*** -0.357 1.462***
(0.683) (-1.394) (3.040) (-0.664) (3.184)
m4 immig -0.153 0.0944 -0.247 0.113 -0.184
(-0.387) (0.290) (-1.038) (0.441) (-0.843)
m4 terr kill pm 8.765 7.112 1.653 3.110 0.865
(1.148) (1.131) (0.359) (0.631) (0.205)
m4 corr -0.224 -0.286 0.0617 -0.648* 0.0838
(-0.416) (-0.644) (0.190) (-1.861) (0.282)
year 0.178 0.791 -0.613 0.400 -0.660*
(0.270) (1.458) (-1.545) (0.940) (-1.817)
L.r gdp pc 0.000352 6.63e-05 0.000286 -7.08e-05 0.000299
(0.908) (0.207) (1.224) (-0.283) (1.397)
Constant -287.7 -1,542 1,254 -748.7 1,341*
(-0.219) (-1.427) (1.587) (-0.884) (1.854)
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.410 0.310 0.431 0.322 0.413
Number of country 27 27 27 27 27
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
14
4.1 Aggregate populist vote share and largest populist party vote share
The results for the five regressions described in the previous section are displayed in tables 2
(individual results) and 3 (proposed regression). Estimates point towards weak significance of
the impact of GDP growth in the populist vote share in the individual regressions. However, the
proposed regressions seem to indicate a negative impact of real GDP growth on both total and
left-wing populist vote share. This result would also suggest that large recessions are likely to
induce increases in populist vote share, especially the left-wing type.
A different story occurs with the unemployment rate. Individually, it displays a significant
positive impact on left-wing populism, similar to what was seen in Spain and Greece, two
countries that were plagued with abnormally high unemployment rates during the European
Sovereign Debt Crisis, while in the proposed regression it seems cease to be significant even for
left-wing populism. It is likely that being together with real GDP growth rate takes away some
explanation power from it.
A decrease in industrial employment seems to discourage vote in either specification. This
is a major result and indicates that deindustrialization may create space for support of left-wing
populism.
Trade, financial and interpersonal globalizations seem to also lose their ”explanatory pow-
ers” when combined with the others versus when they stand individually. Cultural Globalization
retains some mild significance although the coefficient sign is inverted, indicating it negatively
influences both total and right-wing populism. This could be explained by the fact that more
culturally globalized european countries have less populism prevalence than least globalized
countries (particularly from the former eastern block). Even though the interpretation of the
coefficients from the individual regressions seems more straightforward and in accordance with
the literature, there are correlations between independent variables that need to be considered,
which can only occur in multivariate regressions. This is a general aspect and does not con-
cern this variable only. These coefficients show a positive influence on right-wing populism
but a negative one on left-wing populism, indicating that perhaps cultural globalization makes
left-wing populism less attractive while at the same time it generates a backlash and spurring
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especially right-wing populism.
Government expenditure does not show up as significant individually but is included nonethe-
less in the proposed regression as the sole representative of the Government story. In the pro-
posed regression it displays a surprising positive effect on left-wing populism support.
Immigration displays a negative impact on left-wing populism individually but in the pro-
posed regression it has no impact whatsoever on the support of any sort of populism. This
result could be related to idea that the size of immigration is largely overestimated by some in
the native population. So while fears from immigration can lead to the support of right-wing
populism, it might be that it is political speech that incentivizes that fear and not the sheer
amount of immigration per se.
A theme that is often connected to that of immigration is that of terrorism due to the fear
is creates and it is a common, though sometimes overstated, connection to immigration from
Middle Eastern countries. Individually, casualties from terrorism seem to drive demand for
right-wing populism, but together with the other variables it loses significance.
Finally, corruption seemed most relevant individually on total populist vote share and left-
wing vote share. The reason it may only occur with broad left-wing populism support but not
with the largest left-wing populist party is that the latter may be already conflated with the
”establishment”. In the proposed regression, however, it ceases to be significant for left-wing
populism (though retaining the sign) but significant and positive for the support of the largest
right-wing populist party
4.2 Number of populist parties
The results for the three regressions described in Section 3 are displayed in tables 4 (individual
results) and 5 (proposed regression). Real GDP growth has no statistical effect on the number of
populist parties arising in either specification. Individually, unemployment shows some positive
significant effect on the number of left-wing populist parties but loses such significance in the
proposed regression.
Inflation shows a rather odd significant negative relationship with total number of populist
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Individual Regressions of number of parties dependent variables
VARIABLES t count r count l count
L.r gdp pc 1.20e-05 -1.44e-06 1.36e-05
(0.222) (-0.308) (0.805)
m4 growth 0.0776* 0.0466 0.0307
(1.658) (1.475) (1.134)
m4 unemp 0.0631* 0.0169 0.0462**
(1.763) (0.692) (2.339)
m4 infl -0.00463*** -0.00368*** -0.000980
(-2.936) (-3.358) (-1.115)
m4 emp agr -0.135** -0.0751* -0.0635**
(-2.518) (-1.738) (-2.436)
m4 emp ind 0.179*** 0.126** 0.0531*
(2.952) (2.588) (1.768)
m4 rural p 0.157*** 0.0959*** 0.0679***
(4.553) (4.061) (3.406)
m4 glob 0.0307 0.0362** -0.00543
(1.206) (2.116) (-0.374)
m4 eco glob -0.00480 0.0112 -0.0160*
(-0.316) (1.093) (-1.865)
m4 soc glob 0.131*** 0.0839*** 0.0472***
(4.798) (4.523) (2.948)
m4 trade glob -0.00141 0.00353 -0.00494
(-0.0897) (0.333) (-0.553)
m4 fin glob -0.00518 0.0119 -0.0171**
(-0.432) (1.478) (-2.543)
m4 intper glob -0.00666 0.00866 -0.0153
(-0.250) (0.481) (-1.013)
m4 cult glob 0.0618*** 0.0369*** 0.0249***
(5.487) (4.778) (3.767)
m4 govexp -0.247*** -0.128*** -0.122***
(-3.928) (-2.884) (-3.456)
m4 tax rev 0.0450 0.0282 0.0181
(1.579) (1.483) (1.103)
m4 immig 0.00776 -0.00276 0.0105
(0.195) (-0.0906) (0.545)
m4 refug -0.0173 -0.0252 0.00830
(-0.479) (-0.877) (0.463)
m4 terr att 0.0112*** 0.00464 0.00641***
(2.648) (1.604) (2.677)
m4 terr kill 0.00369 6.50e-05 0.00349
(0.571) (0.0148) (0.950)
m4 terr att pm 0.212** 0.117* 0.0929*
(2.409) (1.950) (1.851)
m4 terr kill pm -0.137* -0.102* -0.0369
(-1.704) (-1.862) (-0.804)
m4 corr -0.0636 -0.0229 -0.0396
(-1.340) (-0.641) (-1.592)
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Fixed effects proposed regression of the number of populist parties
(1) (2) (3)
Variables t count r count l count
m4 growth -0.0538 -0.0431 -0.0107
(-0.790) (-0.755) (-0.327)
m4 unemp 0.0603 0.0482 0.0121
(1.031) (0.983) (0.431)
m4 infl -0.00840 0.00767 -0.0161
(-0.366) (0.399) (-1.456)
m4 emp agr 0.209** 0.219** -0.00949
(2.013) (2.512) (-0.190)
m4 emp ind 0.223* 0.257** -0.0333
(1.802) (2.471) (-0.558)
m4 rural p 0.0833 0.0524 0.0310
(1.105) (0.829) (0.854)
m4 fin glob 0.0185 0.00950 0.00904
(0.711) (0.435) (0.720)
m4 cult glob 0.0740*** 0.0593** 0.0147
(2.717) (2.599) (1.122)
m4 govexp -0.266** -0.130 -0.135**
(-2.372) (-1.390) (-2.510)
m4 terr att 0.0118 0.00997 0.00179
(1.555) (1.574) (0.492)
m4 corr -0.0384 0.0337 -0.0721**
(-0.556) (0.582) (-2.171)
year 0.0553 0.112* -0.0565
(0.703) (1.696) (-1.493)
r gdp pc 4.74e-05 6.63e-05 -1.89e-05
(0.834) (1.392) (-0.691)
Constant -119.2 -238.7* 119.5
(-0.746) (-1.782) (1.554)
Observations 145 145 145
R-squared 0.243 0.228 0.275
Number of country 28 28 28
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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parties and the number of right-wing populist parties. This could be partially explained by the
fall in inflation in the Euro Area countries after the adoption of the common currency and after
2012, coinciding with a rise in the number of populist parties both in total and of right-wing
populist type. In the proposed regression it ceases to be significant and even flips sign for the
number of right-wing parties.
Both agricultural and industrial employment seem to encourage right-wing populism. It is
an interesting result. It indicates that deindustrialization and, by association, modernization,
discourage the creation of right-wing parties. This notion is reenforced by the individual coef-
ficients of rural population, which are also positive.
Financial globalization loses significance with the number of left-wing populist parties when
looking from the individual regression. Cultural globalization on the other hand retains its
significance and positive sign with both the total number of populist parties and the number of
right-wing populist parties in the proposed regression. This is more in line with the literature as
it indicates a populist backlash from an increase in globalization.
Government expenditure displays only negative coefficients in both specifications, just fail-
ing to be significant with the number of right-wing populist parties in the proposed regression.
This is in accordance with some literature that points out a shelter effect of government against
populist, particularly through social welfare.
Neither immigration or refugees show significant coefficients in the individual regressions.
It may be the case that some populists, particularly right-wing populists, do not protest high
levels of immigration but immigration in any dimension, which is a feature of nativist politics.
Terrorism doesn’t make it across either from the individual regressions to the proposed
model, while corruption, even though it has no significance individually, becomes significant
with a negative effect on left-wing populist.
4.3 Populist vote dynamics
The results for the three regressions described in Section 3 are displayed in table 6. All but one
of the lagged dependent variables show a significant positive coefficient. That variable is the
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lagged number of right-wing populist parties running for election.
Looking at the coefficients lagged dependent variables of vote shares, the results indicate
a strong momentum with these variables. A possible interpretation is that voters are more
likely to keep voting for populist parties if they have done so in the previous election. This is
also consistent with the patterns seen in figures 1 to 4. The average right-wing populist vote
share has risen consistently since 1980. Left-wing populist vote shares have also been climbing
steadily, although at a slower pace, since the slump after the fall of the Soviet block. If former
eastern block countries are excluded, both populist spectrums have been increasing their vote
shares at a similar pace since the mid 1990’s.
The significant coefficient in the number of left-wing populist parties and the non significant
coefficient of the number of right-wing populist parties may indicate that less persistence on the
right and more on the left.
5 Conclusion
Populism is probably one of the most interesting research topics nowadays in the age of Trump,
O´rban, and Le Pen but also SYRIZA and Podemos. It is changing the face of world politics and
particularly of european politics at a time of great uncertainty regarding the european project,
whose core values are being challenged by this new wave of populism.
Poor economic performance in general and the lack of protection of the population from that
performance and from rapid changes in the economy can lead to popular support for populist
alternatives that advocate a manichean world view that can harm the functioning of modern
liberal and plural democracies.
A better scrutiny of politics, wether from the media or from academics, is vital for the
maintenance of healthy democracies and for the mitigation of the fear which populists feed on.
The european project also plays a part in this process and it should be reformed so that it can
answer today’s problems and not become part of the problem.
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Table 6: Fixed effects proposed regressions with respective lagged dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES t pop r pop l pop r larg l larg t count r count l count
m4 growth -0.765 -0.365 -0.401 -0.202 -0.474* -0.00270 -0.0199 0.00454
(-1.644) (-0.921) (-1.508) (-0.656) (-1.836) (-0.0401) (-0.350) (0.138)
m4 unemp 0.609 0.451 0.212 0.193 0.0914 0.0578 0.0390 0.0258
(1.191) (1.019) (0.724) (0.568) (0.323) (1.000) (0.777) (0.909)
m4 infl -0.00285 0.00869 -0.0119
(-0.126) (0.446) (-1.074)
m4 emp agr 0.153 0.186** -0.00367
(1.493) (2.079) (-0.0752)
m4 emp ind -0.203 0.767 -0.901 0.239 -0.986* 0.152 0.213** -0.0265
(-0.215) (0.957) (-1.651) (0.382) (-1.875) (1.243) (2.000) (-0.457)
m4 rural p 0.0362 0.0444 0.00573
(0.477) (0.690) (0.154)
m4 trade glob 0.0186 0.0109 0.00781 0.136 0.0728
(0.0664) (0.0457) (0.0488) (0.733) (0.466)
m4 fin glob 0.248 0.0642 0.217 0.116 0.149 0.0127 0.00484 0.0138
(1.070) (0.317) (1.624) (0.751) (1.146) (0.498) (0.216) (1.107)
m4 intper glob -0.677 -0.339 -0.334 -0.377 -0.270
(-1.566) (-0.918) (-1.348) (-1.312) (-1.125)
m4 cult glob -0.390* -0.252 -0.167 -0.197 -0.153 0.0684** 0.0580** 0.0108
(-1.838) (-1.373) (-1.351) (-1.386) (-1.287) (2.551) (2.510) (0.831)
m4 govexp 0.308 -1.027 1.321*** -0.473 1.364*** -0.275** -0.153 -0.114**
(0.393) (-1.541) (2.942) (-0.909) (3.144) (-2.548) (-1.633) (-2.166)
m4 immig -0.163 0.00317 -0.131 0.0267 -0.113
(-0.441) (0.00996) (-0.615) (0.107) (-0.546)
m4 terr att 0.00880 0.00908 0.00155
(1.180) (1.400) (0.436)
m4 terr kill pm 6.648 6.770 -0.320 3.404 -0.356
(0.927) (1.109) (-0.0777) (0.715) (-0.0893)
m4 corr -0.0213 -0.119 0.0630 -0.545 0.0917 -0.0137 0.0318 -0.0601*
(-0.0419) (-0.273) (0.218) (-1.610) (0.327) (-0.205) (0.552) (-1.882)
year 0.340 0.869 -0.535 0.408 -0.599* 0.0450 0.110 -0.0543
(0.551) (1.648) (-1.511) (0.994) (-1.746) (0.587) (1.651) (-1.467)
L.r gdp pc 0.000393 6.23e-05 0.000339 -1.03e-05 0.000298 5.17e-06 3.30e-05 -1.75e-05
(1.083) (0.201) (1.625) (-0.0423) (1.479) (0.102) (0.758) (-0.714)
lag t pop 0.310***
(3.508)
lag r pop 0.256**
(2.433)
lag l pop 0.359***
(4.661)
lag r larg 0.266**
(2.629)
lag l larg 0.276***
(3.313)
lag t count 0.265**
(2.622)
lag r count 0.115
(1.074)
lag l count 0.251**
(2.366)
Constant -619.0 -1,697 1,088 -764.6 1,214* -94.51 -231.0* 113.9
(-0.503) (-1.616) (1.543) (-0.936) (1.777) (-0.606) (-1.708) (1.513)
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 145 145 145
R-squared 0.489 0.358 0.554 0.376 0.485 0.288 0.229 0.310
Number of country 27 27 27 27 27 28 28 28
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Cross-correlation table
Variables t pop r pop l pop r larg l larg t count r count l count
rural p 0.222*** 0.141** 0.145** 0.120** 0.129** -0.058 -0.095 0.007
(0.000) (0.020) (0.017) (0.048) (0.034) (0.340) (0.118) (0.908)
emp agr -0.073 -0.030 -0.072 -0.050 -0.093 -0.167** -0.141** -0.109
(0.303) (0.667) (0.307) (0.476) (0.188) (0.018) (0.045) (0.124)
emp ind 0.128 0.183*** -0.080 0.154** -0.047 -0.183*** 0.015 -0.284***
(0.069) (0.009) (0.260) (0.029) (0.504) (0.009) (0.829) (0.000)
growth -0.098 -0.082 -0.033 -0.063 -0.012 -0.156** -0.130** -0.106*
(0.117) (0.189) (0.595) (0.318) (0.849) (0.012) (0.038) (0.091)
unemp 0.109* 0.058 0.087 -0.000 0.047 0.331*** 0.309*** 0.200***
(0.081) (0.356) (0.165) (0.997) (0.449) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
infl -0.101 -0.051 -0.086 -0.077 -0.081 -0.187*** -0.148** -0.137**
(0.106) (0.416) (0.170) (0.221) (0.199) (0.003) (0.018) (0.028)
r gdp pc -0.066 -0.011 -0.089 -0.002 -0.097 0.152** 0.107* 0.119*
(0.295) (0.863) (0.158) (0.973) (0.125) (0.016) (0.089) (0.058)
glob 0.091 0.186*** -0.133** 0.215*** -0.147** 0.282*** 0.302*** 0.134**
(0.153) (0.003) (0.035) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034)
eco glob 0.019 0.108* -0.132** 0.143** -0.106* -0.219*** -0.044 -0.283***
(0.769) (0.088) (0.037) (0.024) (0.096) (0.000) (0.492) (0.000)
soc glob -0.101 -0.029 -0.118* 0.015 -0.120* 0.060 0.012 0.078
(0.112) (0.645) (0.063) (0.813) (0.058) (0.342) (0.851) (0.218)
trade glob 0.030 0.104 -0.108* 0.143** -0.062 -0.425*** -0.177*** -0.465***
(0.636) (0.100) (0.088) (0.024) (0.328) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
fin glob 0.005 0.091 -0.128* 0.116 -0.124** 0.008 0.084 -0.067
(0.937) (0.151) (0.042) (0.068) (0.049) (0.904) (0.188) (0.292)
intper glob -0.111* -0.112* -0.010 -0.087 -0.022 0.012 -0.076 0.089
(0.081) (0.077) (0.881) (0.171) (0.730) (0.846) (0.233) (0.160)
cult glob 0.137** 0.249*** -0.154** 0.277*** -0.169*** 0.209*** 0.291*** 0.037
(0.030) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.558)
corr 0.375*** 0.327*** 0.100 0.250*** 0.089 0.004 0.191*** -0.170**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.137) (0.000) (0.186) (0.948) (0.004) (0.011)
terr att -0.128** -0.146** 0.013 -0.143** 0.004 0.478*** 0.306*** 0.422***
(0.036) (0.017) (0.832) (0.019) (0.943) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
terr kill -0.177*** -0.144** -0.067 -0.150** -0.065 0.352*** 0.245*** 0.292***
(0.004) (0.018) (0.269) (0.013) (0.285) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
terr att pm -0.070 -0.221*** 0.217*** -0.224*** 0.220*** 0.092 -0.099 0.232***
(0.253) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.131) (0.105) (0.000)
terr kill pm -0.140** -0.186*** 0.052 -0.192*** 0.061 0.124** 0.024 0.162***
(0.021) (0.002) (0.394) (0.002) (0.316) (0.043) (0.697) (0.008)
govexp 0.057 0.153** -0.138** 0.179*** -0.140** -0.095 0.081 -0.222***
(0.371) (0.015) (0.028) (0.004) (0.026) (0.131) (0.199) (0.000)
tax rev -0.105 0.018 -0.196*** 0.033 -0.204*** -0.173*** -0.183*** -0.083
(0.104) (0.784) (0.002) (0.607) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.202)
immig -0.282*** -0.259*** -0.057 -0.225*** -0.044 -0.024 -0.181** 0.141*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.462) (0.003) (0.573) (0.754) (0.019) (0.069)
refug -0.184** -0.105 -0.137* -0.106 -0.134* -0.195*** -0.159** -0.132*
(0.010) (0.145) (0.056) (0.141) (0.063) (0.007) (0.027) (0.067)
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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